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MECESUP  Quality and Equity Improvement in Higher Education (Mejoramiento de 
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MINEDUC  Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación) 
PAA  Academic Aptitude Test (Prueba de Aptitud Académica) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chile is rapidly moving to a mass tertiary education system. Over the past decade enrollment 
in Chilean higher education expanded significantly from about 250,000 students in 1990 to 
more than 500,000 in 2003. Nearly all of the expansion was financed by private sources, 
reflecting a policy of cost-recovery and growth in private provision of tertiary education. 
Today, Chile is among the countries in Latin America that allocate the least public funding to 
higher education relative to GDP. Yet, due to sizable private spending, Chile features the 
highest share of GDP allocated to higher education in the region. 
Significant private contributions to the financing of tertiary education provide an 
opportunity for the Chilean government to strategically reorient resources to core public 
sector responsibilities. By prioritizing public resources and focusing on value for money, 
Chile may address pressing sector issues such as inequities, insufficient supply of doctoral 
graduates and lack of coherence and flexibility between tertiary learning settings. 
The Government of Chile has already begun a process of reprioritizing public resources by 
significantly scaling up support for student loan programs. In addition, about 7 percent of 
public financing for tertiary education is tied to a best-student formula and 5 percent of the 
base funding for the 25 traditional universities is allocated according to performance criteria. 
Nonetheless, unrealized potential remains for tying funding to desired educational outcomes. 
Almost half of all public subsidies for tertiary education are allocated based on historical 
precedence and there is no system for collecting reliable, standardized information on the 
performance of tertiary institutions. 
This paper profiles international experiences and discusses strengths and weaknesses in 
approaches to results-based funding of tertiary education in order to identify finance reform 
options for Chile. The structure of the paper reflects the phases involved in designing a 
results-based funding system. The first section briefly describes the Chilean public financing 
system of tertiary education. Section two discusses the need for establishing data collection 
structures and identifies steps involved in selecting performance criteria. Section three 
outlines strengths and weaknesses of design options drawing on examples of results-based 
funding systems in Africa, Europe, Latin America and North America. With a complete 
evaluation model in place, section four reflects on how resources can be tied to selected 
indicators. Section five discusses implementation issues when introducing a results-based 
funding system. Finally, section six outlines possible finance reform options for Chilean 
tertiary education in light of international experiences.  
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1. CHILEAN PUBLIC FINANCING SYSTEM OF TERTIARY EDUCATION 
The Chilean tertiary education system was changed profoundly during the 1980s following 
the most radical reforms to university education ever attempted in the region. The reforms 
aimed at improving efficiency by deregulating the sector and stimulating private provision. 
Moreover, the reforms sought to alleviate the finance burden of the state by charging tuition 
to students and encouraging higher education institutions to diversify their funding sources. 
As a result, Chile today features one of the strongest markets for tertiary education in the 
region. 
The Chilean tertiary education system is comprised by three types of institutions: 
Universities offer undergraduate first-degree and postgraduate programs. They are the only 
institutions authorized to award bachelor, master and doctoral academic degrees in Chile. 
Moreover, universities are the only institutions authorized to award professional certificates 
in 17 professional fields (engineering, medicine, law, psychology, architecture, etc.). 
Professional institutes (IP) deliver four-year programs and are authorized to award 
professional certificates in any field, excluding the 17 fields that are the prerogative of 
universities.  Technical Training Centers (CTF) offer two-year technical vocational 
programs which lead to a Higher Technical Level Certificate. 
Table 1. The Chilean Tertiary Educational System, 2002 
  Institutions  Enrollment 
Council of Rectors Universities  25  243,593 
Private Universities  38  125,740 
Professional institutes  51  91,153 
Technical Training Centers  115  61,123 
Total 229  521,609 
Source: MINEDUC (2003) 
Tertiary institutions are subjected to a statuary regime according to which they are located in 
one out of four categories, full autonomy, accredited, examined and supervised. Institutions 
with full autonomy have substantial freedom to plan and organize programs, designate 
personnel and administer the budget. The 25 traditional council of rectors universities were 
declared autonomous by definition. Chile has been a regional forerunner in quality assurance 
of tertiary education institutions and their course programs. Since 1999, provisionary 
national accreditation commissions have set standards and granted formal recognition to 
programs at the graduate and undergraduate level based on self-assessments and external 
peer-review processes. 
To administer admissions, traditional universities set up, more than 30 years ago, the 
Academic Aptitude Test (PAA) comprising skills centered exams on math and language and 
more specific knowledge centered tests on various subjects. The PAA is designed and scored 
in accordance with international assessment standards. Access to traditional universities is 
highly competitive, with a few institutions concentrating most of the applicants. 
Levels and mechanisms of funding 
Chile allocates a total of 2.2 percent of GDP to tertiary education, which is the highest 
percentage in the Latin American region (Graph 1). Due to the aforementioned policy of 
cost-recovery, most resources come from private sources. This reflects high private rates of 
return for tertiary graduates in the labor market and a political decision to target public 
resources to basic education and other social priorities.  
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Source: OECD (2002a), World Bank (2002d) and World Bank (2002b and 2003) 
Public sector funding of tertiary education comprises only 0.6 percent of GDP. This 
translates into one of the lowest public expenditure per tertiary student in Latin America. 
Moreover, spending on tertiary education is well balanced against the primary and secondary 
level. Primary education is currently averaging about 64 percent of annual funds allocated to 
education, secondary 20 percent and higher education only 16 percent (MINEDUC 2004). 
Decreto Fuerza de Ley no. 4 from 1981 regulates public financing of Chilean tertiary education. 
Funding is allocated through four mechanisms: (i) direct public support (AFD) to the 25 
traditional public and private universities; (ii) indirect public support (AFI) of public and 
private institutions linked to a best-student formula; (iii) funding for institutional 
development and quality improvement; and (iv) student financial assistance in the 
form of scholarships and a loan system for students enrolled in traditional universities based 
on an income contingent repayment scheme
2. 
Graph 2 shows the evolution and composition of public expenditures in tertiary education. 
Public expenditures for tertiary education more than doubled in real terms between 1980 
and 2003. Notably, public subsidies for student financial support, direct public support 
(AFD) and funds for institutional quality improvement projects increased (MECESUP). 
Meanwhile, indirect public support (AFI) has remained stable. In 1990, AFI represented 18 
percent of total public expenditures on tertiary education; in 2003, it was reduced to 7 
percent. 
                                                 
2 A project law is currently under review in the Chilean legislature, which would open up financial 
assistance to students attending other tertiary institutions than the traditional 25 universities.  
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Source: MINEDUC (2004) 
Direct public support 
One of the most contentious issues regarding tertiary education in Chile is the direct 
financial support given to the 16 public and 9 private universities that existed before tertiary 
education was reformed in the early 1980s. AFD comprises about 50 percent of total public 
spending on tertiary education. Yet, Chile’s 38 non-traditional private universities, 51 
professional institutes and 115 technical training centers have no access to AFD. 
95 percent of AFD is allocated to universities based on historical precedence and a process 
of political negotiation without systematic reference to obtained results. This allocation 
process maintains a highly uneven distribution of AFD funds between traditional 
institutions. As revealed in Graph 3, per student AFD funds vary from more than 1,400 
USD per student for the University of Talca to about 150 USD per student for the Catholic 
University of Temuco. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AFD (95%) per student Performance-based allocations relative to AFD
5% results-based funding
 
Source: Universidad de la Frontera (2004)  
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Five percent of AFD is allocated to universities based on input, process and output criteria. 
These funds are allocated according to the relative scoring of each university on five 
weighted indicators: (i) critical mass obtained in each career measured by the number of 
undergraduate enrollees per program; (ii) internal efficiency measured by student-teacher 
ratios; (iii) quality measured by the number of faculty holding advanced degrees; (iv) 
scientific quality measured by the number of research projects per full time equivalent 
scholar; and (v) scientific production measured by the number of publications per 
researcher. High weights are placed on quality and scientific activities (84 percent) and low 
weights are given to efficiency and, particularly, enrollees per program. 
Graph 3 reveals that performance funding does not mirror the distribution of AFD. 
Institutions that receive the least funding per student are all well above the default five 
percent results-based funding. In absolute terms University of Arturo Prat and Austral 
University, for example, obtained almost the same amount of performance funding in 2003, 
while total AFD funding per student was almost three times higher at the Austral University. 
Results-based funding provides AFD universities an incentive to perform, especially in 
regard to the quality of staff and scientific activity. However, due to its structure and size, the 
mechanism has had limited impact in the sector. Moreover, problems have been 
encountered in the operation of the mechanism, which reduce its positive implications on 
transparency in the Chilean university system. Notably, the lack of a national information 
system with reliable, standardized statistics and unambiguous baselines has given way to 
errors and inconsistencies in the reporting from universities. 
A bill is currently under review in the Chilean Congress that would write national 
accreditation of tertiary institutions into law and mandate the establishment of a national 
information system for post-secondary education. As a minimum, institutions would be 
required to provide statistics related to students, faculty, resources, infrastructure and 
learning outcomes. Collected information would be validated by the Ministry of Education 
and published annually (MINUDUC 2003). Consultations have begun between the Ministry 
of Education and key universities on definitions and criteria, but a final design is yet to be 
agreed upon. 
Indirect public support 
All institutions offering tertiary learning opportunities in Chile are eligible for indirect public 
support. The AFI is distributed to institutions according to their ability to attract the 27,500 
highest scoring students in the university admission exam (PAA). In 2003, the distribution of 
AFI between institutions was: 82 percent for the 25 traditional universities, 17 percent for 
private universities and 1 percent for IPs and CFTs.  
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Source: Larrañaga (2001) 
Indirect public funding has been successful in providing tertiary institutions – public and 
private – a strong incentive to respond to student needs and provide learning opportunities 
of high quality and relevance. As such, the AFI has been an important example of 
performance funding in Chilean tertiary education. Nonetheless, potential exists for 
improving the mechanism, particularly in regard to equity. As Graph 4 shows, PAA 
achievement – and hence AFI allocations – is closely linked to the ability to pay for quality 
basic education (Bernasconi and Rojas 2004). An alternative approach to AFI would be to tie 
the capitation grant to the best students from the lowest three income quintiles. 
Funds for institutional development 
In 1998 a decision was taken to gradually phase out the Institutional Development Fund due 
to criticism that political criteria dominated the allocation of funds. These shortcomings 
were challenged by the creation of a competitive fund for quality improvement (MECESUP) 
under which all tertiary institutions are eligible for support. 
Designed to accelerate processes of institutional modernization, the MECESUP fund 
supports projects developed and proposed by tertiary institutions. Committees of peers 
review and select proposals according to transparent procedures and criteria. Thus far, 
supported areas include: (i) technical training programs; (ii) undergraduate programs in the 
hard sciences; (iii) graduate programs in all areas; and (iv) curricula redesign (World Bank 
1998). 
Setting the stage for reform 
With only five percent of AFD allocated on a true performance basis, significant potential 
exists for increasing transparency and tying incentives to key sector priorities by rescaling 
and reforming existing public funding structures. Despite good intentions and a decade long 
debate, no action has so far been taken to supplement demand side financing with changes 
to the public funding regime for tertiary education established in the early 1980s. This may 
be for good reason. Results-based funding systems are difficult to design and may be met 
with considerable resistance from key stakeholders. It is against this background that the 
following sections discuss preconditions, design options, tradeoffs and strategies to be 
considered when tying funding to results. 
2. FUNDING HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS BASED ON RESULTS 
Results-based funding can be defined as the allocation of resources contingent on achieved 
rather than promised results. Tying funding to results departs from traditional considerations 
in tertiary education of line item expenditures and inflationary increases. These constitute  
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input factors and disregard results, such as graduation rates, learning outcomes and the 
contribution of university research to society (Fielding 1999). 
Performance management rests on the assumption that effective government cannot be 
achieved within a classic bureaucratic framework of tight regulatory control of sources and 
methods of production. The relationship between the government and public tertiary 
education institutions can be described within the context of the principal-agent model. The 
providers of higher education have more information about education processes than the 
government. The government (the principal) therefore delegates part of the decision-
authority to the institutions (the agents). However, the information asymmetries between the 
government and the institutions can create agency problems: institutions can exploit their 
information advantages to pursue other goals. These agency problems typically arise when 
funding is based on inputs or on historical patterns. As the government cannot observe the 
effort of university staff, the system may preserve inefficiencies and ineffective programs. 
A way to overcome such agency problems is to redesign funding systems, so that incentives 
of the principal and the agents converge. This is the essence behind the idea of results-based 
funding. Governments should be tight on setting goals for tertiary institutions and assessing 
results and provide flexibility on the methods used to achieve these ends. Thus, decision 
makers would assume a ‘stimulative and facilitative’ role centered on incentive-induced-
change rather than control and prescribe actions at the decentralized level (Windham and 
Peng 1997). 
Building systems for results-based funding 
Higher education systems are of high complexity and cater to multiple objectives. Hence, 
building a funding system without perverse incentives or unintended consequences requires 
careful consideration of design options. Perfection is unlikely to be ensured in the design 
phase and progress is often based on trial and error during implementation. 
The impact of incentive driven institutional change is contingent on the tailoring of 
components to fit national and systemic characteristics. Even when an administrative culture 
has become obsolete or dysfunctional it remains necessary to understand its institutional 
roots to secure durable improvements. Equally important, administrative capacity limitations 
and other institutional constraints must be taken into account when designing funding 
systems (Schiavo-Campo 1999). 
Kusek and Rist (2002) propose adjusting the complexity and ambition of a results-based 
funding system based on a ‘readiness assessment’. Performing such an assessment gives 
reforming agencies an understanding of what institutional capacity they do or do not have 
and what resource can be drawn upon to initiative reform. A ‘readiness assessment’ can also 
help to clarify where within a government reforms might begin, under the auspices of who 
and what demand exists for the use of collected information. 
Information systems 
As governments begin to address the challenges of results-based funding, they face the need 
to document performance with valid and reliable information. Allocating resources based on 
institutional performance presupposes credible and timely national and institutional statistics 
on a wide range of indicators. Without a good information system no basis exists for 
evaluating institutional performance. When reliable data are lacking, the priority must be to 
build a data and monitoring capability before considering the introduction of results-based 
funding (Schiavo-Campo 1999).  
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Box 1. University Information System (SIU) in Argentina 
Initiated in 1994 under the Programa de Reforma de la Educación Superior (PRES) the Argentine 
Government has led the design and operation of an internet-based management information and 
statistical data system that integrates various existing modules needed for decision-making at the 
ministerial and decentralized level and provides adequate data and system compatibility with 
statistical systems of public universities. 
The SIU consists of five main software modules: (i) accounting and budget; (ii) staff management; 
(iii) university statistics; (iv) library management and (v) student management. All modules are 
merged into a single platform and are available through the Internet for all participants. Close 
consultation with end-users in the development phase has ensured that modules are easy-to-use 
and compile data of high relevance. 
Source: World Bank 2004 (ICR) 
Establishing structures for data collection often involves designing computer systems that 
standardize information and reduce the administrative burden of handling large quantities of 
data. Some of the elements that need to be addressed are responsibilities for data collection, 
reporting and evaluation of collected information. Since institutions will be funded based on 
collected information, systems need build in safeguards and structures for external validation 
of data. National auditing agencies are often well-positioned and sufficiently independent to 
carry out this task. 
Given the complexity of getting reporting structures right it may improve changes of success 
if performance reporting precedes results-based funding. Requiring tertiary institutions to 
present periodic reports on priority indicators prior to the introduction of results-based 
funding familiarizes institutions with data collection and establishes a reliable baseline from 
which institutional performance can be assessed. 
Selecting indicators 
The process of identifying indicators goes to the heart of designing a results-based funding 
system. As pointed out by Burke (2001a) “what gets measured is often what gets valued, and 
what gets funded is even more prized”. 
Indicators are most effective when they mirror the government’s strategy for change in the 
higher education sector. A strategy implies the movement of the sector from its current stage 
to a desirable but uncertain future stage. Because the sector has never been to this future 
position, its intended pathway involves a series of linked hypotheses. In the Chilean Science 
for the Knowledge Economy Project, prioritizing outcomes and making key hypotheses 
explicit was an important first step in selecting indicators (Box 2). Ideally, indicators should 
reflect the aspects of the higher education sector that, if improved, are presumed to result in 
the achievement of general goals such as equity, efficiency and quality (Niven 2002).  
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Box 2. Theory of change: Science for the Knowledge Economy Project in Chile 
The 2003 Science for the Knowledge Economy Project in Chile supports the country’s transition to a 
knowledge-based economy by investing in the innovation system and the stock of human capital. To 
determine where to monitor progress, a causality tree was drawn to display how activities and goals 
interlink. For each arrow in the model an indicator was selected. 
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The pool of indicators provides the project management timely management information on the 
project’s theory of change. Identified weak links permit evidence-based improvements during 
implementation. 
Source: World Bank (2003b) 
Indicators come in four types: Inputs involve the human, financial and physical resources 
received to support programs, activities and services, such as funding, enrollments and 
staffing. The performance criterion corresponding to inputs is economy, i.e., the timely 
acquisition of quality inputs at the lowest possible cost. Processes are the manner in which 
inputs are procured and the means by which results are delivered. Processes are internal to 
an institution and include teaching methods, the use of technology and procurement. 
Process indicators can be useful proxies for performance when output or outcomes cannot 
be defined with clarity.  
Outputs reflect the quantity of products produced such as the number of graduates or the 
number of research articles published. The performance criterion corresponding to outputs 
is efficiency, i.e., maximizing the quantity of outputs in relation to a given total amount of 
inputs. Outcomes cover the quality and societal impact of the products produced. Outcome 
indicators include learning results, job placements and user satisfaction. The performance 
criterion corresponding to outcomes is effectiveness, i.e., maximizing outcomes in relation to 
the outputs produced (Schiavo-Compo 1999).  
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Box 3. Indicators in US university results-based funding systems 
Most states in the US use some form of performance funding or reporting based on different 
indicators reflecting the preferences of policy makers in different states. Burke and Minassians 
(2002b) have made a survey of the indicators used to evaluate performance in US higher 
education. Some of the most commonly used indicators include:  
•  Administrative/academic costs/staff (input) 
•  Tuition and fees (input) 
•  Financial aid (input) 
•  Research sponsored by external sources (input) 
•  Technology/ distance learning (process) 
•  Student transfers (output) 
•  Time-to-degree (output) 
•  Graduation/ retention rate (output) 
•  Job placement (outcome) 
Source: Burke et al. (2002c) 
Each type of indicator reflects a tradeoff between accountability and measurability. Focusing 
exclusively on inputs and processes facilitates the monitoring of what and how means are 
used but neglects the purposes for which resources are obtained. Output indicators are 
relatively simple to observe and quantify but may be only vaguely associated with societal 
impact. Outcome indicators are generally more relevant, but also less useful for assigning 
responsibilities. For most purposes it is preferable to rely on a combination of indicators 
rather than focusing on any single measure. Yet, an abundance of data adds complexity, and 
risks making the performance system unwieldy and difficult to understand. Hence, most 
results-based funding systems attempt to strike a balance between manageability and 
comprehensiveness. 
An indicator should preferably meet the following requirements: (i) easy to calculate; (ii) 
difficult to manipulate; (iii) give a reliable estimate of the institution’s value added and (iv) 
not be subject to noise. First, it should be transparent for institutions and their employees 
how their performance is evaluated. If people do not know how to influence their 
performance, results-based funding is unlikely to work. Second, the indicator must be 
difficult to manipulate. For instance, test scores can be manipulated in several ways, such as 
teaching-to-the-exam and keeping marginal students out of the pool of tested students. 
Third, students learn inside and outside tertiary institutions. The indicator should measure 
the performance of the institution, correcting for external influences. Finally, random factors 
should not have a major impact on selected indicators. 
Several OECD countries have experimented with establishing distinctive indicator sub-
systems for the funding of tertiary education. Separating e.g. indicators for teaching and 
research, as in the United Kingdom, may reduce complexity and allows evaluation criteria 
and follow-up processes to be closely tailored to each sub-system (Box 4). Nonetheless, de-
coupling indicator sub-systems adds to the challenge of creating incentives that support a 
balanced approach to institutional improvement (Jongbloed 2001).  
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Box 4. Separate set of indicators for teaching and research in the UK funding system 
In the United Kingdom the allocation of funding for higher education is based on two separate 
sets of indicators, one for teaching and one for research. Categorizing indicators cater for high 
specificity in the choice of indicators and allow unique follow-up procedures to be established for 
each set of indicators. 
 
Teaching grant 
Funding for teaching is based on several indicators such as number of students, length of courses, 
size of the institution, location, level of specialization and the number of disadvantaged students. 




The calculation of funding for research is based on indicators such as the number of qualified 
researchers, published research documents, the number of research students and external research 
income. The assessment process and the allocation of funding is not solely based on the 
quantitative scoring on each indicator. In the so-called research assessment exercise (RAE), 
committees of peers evaluate the overall quality of research activities in each institution. 
Source: HEFCE 2003 
3. DESIGN OPTIONS – INTERNATIONAL CASES 
Significant variety exists between countries in the methods and processes applied to select 
the criteria by which tertiary institutions are evaluated. Although all contain idiosyncratic 
details, systems can be classified into two categories: System-wide fixed set of indicators where 
little change is introduced over time on the criteria used to evaluate institutions and fixed-term 
performance contracts with explicit evaluation criteria, periodically negotiated between the 
supervising agency and each tertiary institution. 
Fixed set of indicators 
For performance systems with a fixed set of indicators, a distinction can be made between 
simple criteria systems where institutions are evaluated based on one or two indicators and 
multiple criteria systems with several indicators. France, Denmark and the Netherlands are 
examples of countries basing a significant part of institutional funding on a simple criteria 
system. Countries operating a funding system with multiple performance criteria include the 
United States and South Africa. In the Latin American region, Argentina is an example of a 
country that has – on a small scale – experimented with multiple criteria funding of higher 
education. 
Simple criteria systems 
The French tertiary education system receives about 50 percent of its funding based on a 
simple input formula. Funding is tied to the number of students enrolled while adjusting for 
variance in expenses per students in different careers. Calculated funding is allocated to 
institutions as a lump-sum, which provides tertiary institutions with significant budgetary 
autonomy.  
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Box 5. Funding model for French universities 
The basis for calculating funding is the number of students enrolled. The compensation that 
universities receive is tied to the level and type of program that the individual student is enrolled 
in. All programs are categorized in a grid that serves as a weighting device. Funding per student is 
determined using four criteria: 
•  Teaching staff not funded by the central government 
•  Compensation for non-academic staff 
•  Technical requirements and equipment 
•  Teaching facilities 
Source: CDUS 2002 and CHEPS 2001b 
The main advantage of the French system is the simplicity of the funding criterion. As 
pointed out, input indicators make it relatively unproblematic for decision makers to track 
spending and allocate funding. The drawback, however, is weak incentives for universities to 
provide quality education and ensure efficiency by avoiding delays in student completion. 
The  Danish taximeter model uses a simple output criterion to determine the level of 
funding for tertiary institutions. Depending on their research activities, institutions receive 
between 30 and 50 percent of their funding based on their educational production. For each 
student who passes an exam an amount of money is paid to the university. The total of these 
“active” students determines the available funding in a particular year. Universities do not 
receive compensation for students who fail their exams or do not take exams. 
Box 6. The Danish taximeter-model 
The Danish tertiary education funding tariff paid per passed exam, the “taximeter tariff”, varies 
according to the field of study, and has three components: 
•  A tariff for the costs of education and equipment 
•  A tariff for joint costs (e.g. administration, buildings) 
•  A tariff for expenses for experimental sciences and practical training (e.g. in medicine and 
physics) 
Source: CPH and CHEPS (2001) 
The taximeter model promotes efficiency in the tertiary system by highlighting the need for 
students to complete their coursework and progress in the system. Hence, historically 
determined budgetary slack is dealt away with as institutions are only rewarded for their 
incremental “production”. In theory, the taximeter model also facilitates student mobility 
between institutions since funding is tied to the student and not the institution. However, 
the model as implemented in Denmark is not a real voucher since students cannot use the 
taximeter to buy services from private providers. The risk associated with the taximeter 
model is the incentive of institutions to artificially increase pass rates to receive more 
resources. To avoid decreasing educational quality, the model depends on the existence of a 
strong quality assurance mechanism and deep-rooted professional standards among 
university staff. 
The  Dutch  funding system allocates about 50 percent of public funding for university 
teaching based on an output criterion. Whereas the focus in Denmark is exams passed, the 
Dutch system rewards student degree completion. To avoid unintended fluctuations in 
funding, resources are allocated based on two-year averages of the number of graduates. An 
important feature of the Dutch system is that the macro-budget for the university sector is 
determined before deciding on the distribution of resources to individual institutions. Hence, 
the formula does not imperil budget stability.  
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Box 7. Funding model for Dutch universities 
The distribution of resources to individual institutions is constrained by a fixed macro-budget for 
the university sector. The allocation of the budget is based on the number of students who 
completed their program multiplied by the normative study duration (4.5 years) plus the number 
of students who drop out multiplied by an administratively set study duration of these dropouts 
(1.35 years). The total amount of funding is then calculated by multiplying calculated graduation 
numbers by a fixed reimbursement per student (i.e. 4,477 euro for Engineering students and 3,461 
euro for students in other programs in 2001). 
Source: CPH & CHEPS 2001 
The Dutch funding system provides a strong incentive to dismiss incapable students as soon 
as possible and to assist talented students in graduating without delay. The simple 
performance criterion makes it transparent to institutions how they will be evaluated and 
thereby facilitates the adoption of long-term strategies to reduce university dropouts. 
However, as is the case in the Danish and French tertiary funding system, the evaluation 
criterion does not by itself cater multiple objectives such as quality, relevance and equity. 
Multiple criteria systems  
The US state of Tennessee applies multiple performance criteria to about 6 percent of the 
core budget for higher education. The funding system consists of four standards and ten 
indicators, each given a certain weight. Built into the system are provisions that allow 
institutions to be evaluated differently based on the type and duration of their degrees. An 
important characteristic of the funding system is that universities are competing against their 
own record. Hence, a university is not advantaged by the poor performance of another 
institution. The system is revised every five years and each revision gives the state as well as 
the universities a chance to decide on new policies and changes in the nature and number of 
indicators (Bogue 2002). 
Box 8. Performance indicators used in the Tennessee funding formula 
The scorecard represents the weight assigned to each indicator and hence the relative priority given 
to the goal. 
 




Standard 1 – Academic Testing and Program Review 
•  Foundation Testing of General Education Outcomes 
•  Pilot Evaluations of Other General Education Outcome Measures 
•  Program Accountability 
1. Program  Review 
2. Program  Accreditation 















Standard 2 – Satisfaction Studies 
•  Student/Alumni/Employer Surveys 







Standard 3 – Planning and Collaboration 
•  Mission Distinctive Institutional Goals 







Standard 4 – Student Outcomes and Implementation 
•  Output Attainment 
1. Retention/Persistence 
2. Job  Placement 












Total Points  100  100 
 
 
Source: Bogue (2002) 
The implementation of the Tennessee model has been assured through the involvement of 
institutional and government officials in the funding procedure, thereby giving all levels a  
  - 14 -   
sense of ownership to the system. In the 1997-2002 cycle, campuses were for instance 
permitted to choose two performance indicators, one related to their own educational 
interests and one directed to the State’s strategic goals. Yet, the system has been criticized 
for involving too many people and using an excessive amount of resources on calculating 
indicators that are of limited use in tertiary institution internal decision-making (Bogue 
2002). 
The Argentine resource allocation model for tertiary education is designed to close gaps 
between the real budget need in ideal quality and efficiency conditions and the actual budget 
allocated based on historical criteria. Based on three criteria, the model matches the 
estimated minimum necessary resources to finance the current level of scientific, academic 
and administrative activities. 
Box 9. The Argentine AR-model 
Allocation of funding through the AR-model (Asignación de Recursos) is based on the ‘objective’ 
budget. The calculation of this budget draws on the following criteria: 
•  Number of effective students 
•  Pedagogically adequate teacher per student ratios 
•  Teachers' salary scales 
Source: World Bank (2003b) 
Rather than targeting existing base funding of Argentine tertiary institutions, the model is 
applied to increases in public subsidies for tertiary education. Due to Argentina’s economic 
crisis, the model currently only comprises about 4 percent of the public budget for tertiary 
education. 
The South African funding model – applied to 89 percent of the core budget for higher 
education – is another example of a multi-criteria approach. Block grants for public tertiary 
education are divided into four categories reflecting teaching, research and specific 
institutional issues. The Ministry of Education publishes an annual statement, which 
determines how performance criteria will be calculated and weighted. This provides clarity to 
institutions on how they will be evaluated while ensuring a degree of flexibility despite the 
use of pre-selected indicators. 
Box 10. Performance based grants in South Africa 
The funding formula is based on four input and output weightings: 
1. Teaching  inputs: Total number of enrolled second year students is passed through a 
grid, placing enrollees into four study categories, which are weighted according to a) 
course material, b) course level and c) instruction-delivery mode. 
2. Teaching  outputs: Number of enrolled students multiplied by graduation benchmarks. 
Benchmarks are approved by the Minister of Education on a rolling three-year basis. 
3. Research  outputs: Actual totals of doctoral and post-doctoral graduates and research 
publication units for a specific year compared to a normative total according to national 
benchmarks. 
4.  Institutional factors: (a) grants for institutions with large proportions of disadvantaged 
students and (b) grants related to the size of institutions based on the number of enrolled 
students. 
Source: Ministry of Education, South Africa (2004) and Government Gazette (2003) 
An interesting feature of the South African model is the operation of a competitive fund for 
institutional development to supplement the multi-criteria funding system. Critics of results-
based funding often charge correctly that removing resources from institutions with poor 
performance will only make improvement more difficult, if not impossible. In South Africa, 
under-performing institutions are not necessarily destined to declining budgets. By gaining  
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access to earmarked competitive funding, these institutions have an opportunity to improve 
themselves by financing institutional restructuring. Another option would be to place funds 
not earned by poor performing institutions in escrow and releasing them when these 
institutions submit acceptable improvement plans for remediation (Burke 2001a). 
Multiple-criteria funding can cater multiple objectives and can consequently be used as a 
driver for specific, high-priority tertiary education policy components. In contrast to simple 
indicator systems, multiple criteria make it easier for policy makers to ensure a balanced 
sector development and avoid unintended consequences. However, multiple criteria 
formulas may result in a complex and opaque funding system. When providing incentives to 
the decentralized level, simplicity may sometimes provide the greatest benefits. 
Performance contracts 
Results-based funding based on performance contracts is a flexible design where evaluation 
criteria are negotiated between the supervising agency and each tertiary institution. 
Performance contracts are institution specific rather than system-wide in their content and 
application. They typically cover a period of 3-4 years. 
Performance contracts have been used in France  since 1989 – in addition to the 
aforementioned simple input formula – where government adopted a system of university 
funding through performance-centered budget dialogues. These dialogues lead to four-year 
contracts between the government and universities.  
Universities are asked to provide a self-assessment, and to present their plans for the next 
four years. These plans form the basis for discussions with the Ministry of Education. In this 
dialogue, goals and evaluation criteria are identified and agreement is reached on how public 
funding will be tied to results. The contracts are not legally binding documents but 
“reciprocal commitments”, which serve as a reference to make decisions within the 
university system. In 2000, 188 institutions representing 75 percent of total tertiary 
enrollment were involved in contract funding (CHEPS 2001b). 
Box 11. Results-based contracts in French tertiary education 
Results-based contracts in French tertiary education consist of a base and a strategic part. The base 
part targets long-term investments in buildings, equipment and facilities. The strategic part is an 
agreement on the financing of priority projects including new technology, student life and libraries. 
 
Projects suggested under the contractual budget have to be new initiatives that cannot be financed 
through the recurrent budget. To avoid that contractual budgets are used to fill gaps in university 
budgets, objectives and indicators are made very clear and the contracts tailored to each 
institution. The state thereby hopes to stimulate the link between objectives and resources and 
provide an incentive for universities to achieve agreed results. 
Source: CDUS (2002) 
The contractual budget comprises on average about a third of total public subsidies for 
tertiary education. The impact on decision-making processes has been substantial. Notably, 
the contract regime has prompted the development of tools for expenditure analysis and 
management information systems to support institutional improvement processes and 
planning (Musselin and Mignot-Gerad 2002). 
Performance contracts have been met with some resistance from within French universities. 
In part, this reflects a lack of performance dialogue with heads of faculties and departments 
that are responsible for delivering agreed results. Performance contracts are agreements 
between university presidents and the Ministry of Education (Musselin 2002). As Burke and 
Minassians (2002a) point out – drawing on experience from the United States – a key  
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problem is that performance criteria tend to become increasingly invisible on campuses 
below the level of vice presidents, because of the failure to extend performance funding and 
reporting to internal academic units. 
Finland has prioritized consultation in the contract negotiation phase through an intensive 
budget dialogue involving lower management levels and regular reporting between 
universities and the Ministry of Education during the contract period. 
Prior to performance contract negotiations, universities send in proposals including an 
activity and a finance plan for a three-year period. This launches a process of consultation 
where the Ministry of Education and universities identify targets and evaluation criteria. 
Ministry officials and university staff, inter alia, interact in unofficial seminars and meetings in 
order to take account of institutional and disciplinary views and ensure transparency and 
predictability in the negotiation process (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003).  
The Finnish performance contracts include both general goals for the tertiary education 
system such as quality, impact of education and total number of offered degrees as well as 
specific goals for the individual institution.  
Box 12. Finnish performance contracting 
Finnish performance contracts are made up of three parts: core funding, performance funding and 
funding for specific initiatives. Deliverables for all three types of funding are agreed in the 
contract. The core funding remains stable during the tree-year contract period, whereas 
performance funding (approximately 3-5 percent of operational expenditure) is tied to results on a 
number of agreed indicators. Examples of indicators include: 
•  Funding for research from external sources 
•  Assessed learning achievement 
•  Provision of adult education 
•  Graduation time 
•  Participation in international cooperation 
To calculate the amount of performance funding, target figures are multiplied by a field-specific 
cost factor, which is also agreed for the three-year contract period. 
Source: Hölttä and Rekilä 2003 
Funding based on performance contracts gives wide room for political maneuverability and 
prioritization of high profile government policy. While this impairs institutional planning 
beyond the contract period, it caters for political necessities and ensures system endurance. 
Performance contracts offer a significant degree of flexibility to take account of idiosyncratic 
characteristics and needs when tertiary institutions are few and differences between them are 
large. If the tertiary education landscape is fairly homogenous and composed of a high 
number of providers, contracts may not be efficient.  
A notable feature of performance contracts is the high demand they place on the capacity of 
supervisory authorities to engage in an evidence-based dialogue with institutions. Without a 
strong counterpart, information asymmetries may lead to under-performance, as institutions 
are able to press for undemanding targets. Hence, if sufficient steering capacity at the central 
level does not exist, funding tied to a fixed set of system-wide criteria is likely to be more 
effective than contracts in driving institutional improvement. 
4. REWARDING INSTITUTIONS BASED ON PERFORMANCE 
In addition to agreeing on the criteria that will be used to assess institutional performance, a 
need exists to decide how and what proportion of resources will be tied to results. In 
considering how institutions should be rewarded or penalized based on their performance,  
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Burke and Minassians (2002a) have introduced a useful distinction between performance 
funding and performance informed budgeting. 
Performance funding ties public funding directly and tightly to the performance of tertiary 
institutions on one or more predefined indicators. The tie is automatic and formula-based. If 
a university achieves a set target on an indicator, it receives a specific amount of 
performance funding. By contrast, performance informed budgeting allows policy makers and 
administrators to consider institutional achievement on performance indicators as a guiding 
factor in determining resource allocations. The link in performance informed budgeting is 
loose and discretionary (Burke and Minassians 2002a). 
Performance funding and performance informed budgeting each has strengths and 
weaknesses. Performance funding offers a high degree of predictability and provides high 
power incentives for institutions to perform. Funded institutions know precisely how their 
performance will be evaluated and which aspects of their institution need to be strengthened 
in order to obtain additional resources. Hence, performance funding allows long-time 
planning and creates a stable environment in which institutions can improve. Performance 
informed budgeting, on the other hand, provides weaker incentives to perform since 
achieved results are only considered indirectly in the resource allocation process. 
Box 13. Performance funding and performance budgeting in US states 
In 2001 there was a total of 37 US states with either performance funding (19), performance 
informed budgeting (27) or a mixture of the two models (9).  
Performance funding has proven relatively easy to introduce but often difficult to implement and 
maintain. Many states have experimented with performance funding, but in recent years the trend 
has been towards performance informed budgeting, which has proven to be more flexible and 
sustainable. 
In many cases performance informed budgeting models began as performance funding initiatives. 
Missouri, for example, introduced a performance funding system based on indicators. The funding 
model turned out to be too costly and the State ultimately decided to use indicators merely as an 
input to budgeting and the earmarking of funds. 
Nine US states have chosen a dual system with elements of both performance funding and 
performance budgeting, allowing the benefits of each approach to be combined. 
Source: Burke (2002b) 
The profiled strengths and weaknesses are reversed when considering system endurance. 
Performance funding does not allow discretionary policy decisions to be made in light of 
budget constraints or political necessities. With budget shortfall and high institutional 
performance, the system may not endure as decision makers would not be in a position to 
reward institutions according to the agreed formula. By contrast, performance informed 
budgeting provides more flexibility to control aggregate spending and maintain the funding 
system despite changes in economic or political circumstances. A loose tie between funding 
and performance appropriately reflects that budgeting is inherently political, and legislators 
are often reluctant to cede their budgetary discretion to a “rational” performance-based 
budgeting system (Moynihan 2003). 
The described funding types are not mutually exclusive. Designing a system with elements of 
both performance funding and performance budgeting allows the tertiary education system 
to achieve the benefits and counter some of the problems of each approach. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, teaching and research are evaluated based on a fixed set of 
indicators. Yet, the process of determining the scoring on each indicator – and in turn  
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funding – is not entirely quantitative and mechanistic. Qualitative peer review processes 
allow issues such as extra cost of providing for certain types of students and the quality of 
research to be factored in when assigning resources to tertiary institutions (HEFCE 2003). 
Tying government subsidies to indicators 
There are generally three methods by which performance funding can be determined based 
on predefined indicators. First, institutions can be awarded a predetermined amount of 
funding for each unit delivered. Examples of production units include enrollees and tertiary 
graduates. Production unit allocations can be designed to compensate for differences in the 
cost structure of tertiary programs. However, unit-cost mechanisms are rarely able to take 
account of changes in the marginal cost that accompany fluctuations in enrollment (Brown 
and Camber 2002). Second, funding can be tied to the degree an institution reaches agreed targets. 
Full goal achievement triggers a predetermined ceiling amount whereas results below the 
targets are rewarded with a fraction of this amount. Tying funding to target achievement rely 
on a strong capacity at the level of the Ministry of Education to set ambitious, but realistic 
targets. Finally, funding can be allocated according to inter-institutional benchmarking where 
institutions are funded according to their relative scoring on selected indicators. On each 
indicator, the institution that performs the best determines the target. A predetermined cap 
amount is tied to the best achievement, and a fraction of this amount will be allocated to 
institutions according to their relative goal attainment. 
 
Per production unit and degree of target achievement performance allocations install strong 
incentives for performance that are easy to communicate to internal stakeholders. However, 
they presuppose reliable and timely baseline data. Funding tied to inter-institutional 
benchmarking creates an element of competition between public institutions and introduces 
flexibility into institutional funding systems. Nonetheless, benchmarking does not allow for 
institution specific indicators and makes it less transparent for institutions what will trigger 
additional resources. 
Weighing indicators 
Results can be ranked by assigning weights to indicators. This allows supervising authorities 
to promote specific institutional objectives while placing less emphasis on others. Hence, 
weights offer flexibility since they permit political priorities to be reflected in the allocation 
of funding. Weights may also accommodate for changing priorities without opening 
discussions on evaluation criteria.  
While being politically attractive, weights risk undermining the importance of certain goals as 
institutions focus their efforts on indicators with greater weights (Serban 1998). Moreover, 
weights may disproportionately favor institutions that have already achieved high 
performance on some indicators. Assigning equal, or almost equal, weights to all indicators is 
likely to be less contentious, but may trigger frequent changes to the battery of indicators. 
Levels of results-based funding 
Allocating all resources on a performance basis may lead to significant variation in 
institutional funding from one year to another. Budget instability is likely to work to the 
detriment of improvement processes, as tertiary institutions would need to make dramatic 
adjustments to fixed and variable cost structures in order to match the level of funding each 
year. Adjustments imply the hiring of faculty and staff in years where performance is 
positive, and massive layoffs in years when performance does not meet expectations. To 
avoid such fluctuations, most countries limit performance funding to a predefined fraction 
of public subsidies for tertiary education. This need not reduce incentives to perform, as the  
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– in most cases – discretionary nature of results-based funding gives tertiary institutions an 
incentive to pursue it (Brown and Gamber 2002). 
Concern about budget stability often leads government to tie performance funding to 
additional money, that is, funding that comes on top of the base budget tertiary institutions 
would receive in any given year. As demonstrated by the aforementioned move to introduce 
performance funding in Argentina, this approach is vulnerable to budget cuts, as alternative 
funding programs are often the first to be suspended. Introducing results-based funding as a 
fraction of institutional base budgets likely increases the impact on institutional performance 
and reduces the system’s vulnerability to budget cuts. Nonetheless, performance driven cuts 
to base budgets – as pointed out – may require painful adjustments to cost structures from 
year to year. Also, this approach may be met with strong resistance in the design and 
implementation phase, as more stakeholders stand to lose from low institutional 
performance (Serban 1998). 
5. IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementing a performance-based funding system goes beyond technicalities. Even a 
carefully tailored design may fail if it does not rest on some degree of support from key 
stakeholders. Tertiary institutions are generally populated with well-articulated individuals, 
some of which stand to lose from changes in funding structures. Hence, developing an 
implementation strategy with explicit assumptions and contingency plans increases the 
likelihood of success. 
Three methods exist for initiating results-based funding: (a) legislation mandates the system 
and specifies evaluation criteria; (b) legislation mandates the system and establishes the 
framework for decision-makers and institutional management to agree on indicators and 
reward mechanisms; and (c) supervisory authorities in collaboration with institutional 
management voluntarily agree on and adopt a new results-based funding system (Burke and 
Minassians 2002a). 
Mandated systems provide clarity and commit policy makers to systemic changes. While 
mandated systems institute a system on paper, they risk undermining program sustainability 
if they are imposed from above and ignore the importance on consulting stakeholders. No 
consultation generally means no consent and ownership at the decentralized level to results-
based funding.  
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Box 14. UNAM’s failed move to raise tuition 
A 10-month-long student strike during 1999 and 2000 over a move to increase tuition at Mexico’s 
largest university, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), illustrates the complexity of 
implementing finance reforms. 
In March 1999, the University’s governing council passed a general bylaw on payments, thereby 
breaking a tradition of virtually no tuition for the institution’s student body of roughly 300,000. By 
April, UNAM found itself paralyzed by a student strike, and some strikes in solidarity had spread 
to other tertiary institutions in Mexico.  
Students denounced the tuition effort as authoritarian and attacked the approval process as lacking 
in transparency. Of particular controversy was the fact that the Council had met off campus for 
the first time ever when making the decision. Of the 35 members not present at the meeting, 28 
were student representatives. In the end, the university administration gave in to student demands 
by making new tuition voluntary. 
Although less contentious than cost recovery, the painful and lengthy confrontation at UNAM 
illustrates a need to consider the political economy when tying funding to performance. Legitimate 
decision-making implies a complex dynamic of university politics in which a broad range of 
interests and academic perspectives are openly expressed and taken into account. 
Source: Levy et al. (1999) and Ordorika (2002) 
Resistance can be expected from groups that stand to lose from reform. Notably, the success 
of changes to the financing of higher education depends on the incentive system and the 
way incentives are shared. Financing reforms are generally most successful when members 
of the dominant, or powerful group are convinced that they will benefit and those who are 
adversely affected are less influential (Varghese 2004). 
Resistance may also arise from those that will be better off as a result of the reform. Perhaps 
this group is not well informed, or dislikes change and uncertainties. Thus, information and 
actions to demystifying suggested changes to institutional funding is important in the 
preparatory phase. One strategy to build consensus is to offer financial compensation. When 
groups that tend to lose from the reform receive some form of compensation, they might be 
willing to give up their resistance. This strategy is often used in practice, but naturally lowers 
the efficiency gains from the reform. Another approach to garner institutional support is to 
introduce performance funding, at least for the first few years, as additional funding for 
tertiary education. 
Prior to nation-wide introduction, results-based funding models can often be improved 
through small-scale experiments. Pilots and phased implementation create opportunities for 
further refinement and adaptation of the mechanism and scaling up based on evidence and 
lessons learned. Specialized training in data collection, reporting and analysis may be needed 
in tertiary institutions and ministries prior to implementation. Also, management structures 
may need to be updated to operate the system. Careful specification and a common 
understanding of all elements of the system are key to success. Clearly defined 
responsibilities make it apparent to everyone involved what, when, how and by whom 
performance data will be collected and reported to supervisory authorities.  
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6. CONCLUSION - OPTIONS FOR CHILE 
The critical importance of tertiary education in a knowledge-based society suggests a need 
for strengthening linkages between the funding of institutions and achieved results in 
Chilean tertiary education. First, results-based funding would provide Chilean policymakers 
with an opportunity to balance increased accountability with institutional improvement. 
Second, funding by results may increase the efficiency and transparency of the market for 
tertiary education in Chile. Finally, tying incentives to political priorities would serve as an 
effective driver for addressing key sector issues. 
The educational sector is no stranger to transparency and evaluation. Chile has a long 
tradition of openness about learning outcomes and responsiveness to comparative evidence 
from abroad. In tertiary education, a mechanism was recently established to fill information 
gaps on the labor market outcomes of graduates. In addition, accreditation processes have 
provided tertiary institutions with important diagnostic tools and a small fraction of direct 
public support (AFD) is tied to performance. Hence, Chile is in a favorable position to take 
the next step toward funding by results. 
The current concentration of public subsidies and student loans in traditional universities 
can be understood in historical terms. Yet, it is important to evolve the funding system 
toward a system that relates public subsidies more closely with results. When considering 
design options, Chile would be able to draw on a rich base of international experiences and 
good practices in results-based funding. 
One of the main prerequisites for funding by results is the existence of a system for 
collecting and reporting performance information. Although universities and the Ministry of 
Education collect some statistics, significant effort would need to go into building necessary 
information structures with build-in verification procedures and safeguards. The proposed 
law on accreditation would provide a clear mandate to commence this task. 
A simple taximeter design does not suffice. Chile is faced with several sector issues that 
concern more than efficiency and dropouts. Multifaceted sector issues require complex 
responses, which should be mirrored by the incentive structure established by the funding 
system. Multiple-criteria funding can be used to drive the implementation of reforms, e.g. 
pertaining to equity and curricula reform. 
Any funding methodology will need to recognize that there are major differences between 
Chilean tertiary institutions in terms of size, offered degrees and cost structure. The 
University of Chile, for example, has the responsibility for the National Seismology Center. 
The financing of such a center should not be based on the educational performance of the 
Department of Geology.  
Given the heterogenic nature of Chilean tertiary education, a contract design may be most 
effective and manageable. Performance contracts, with periodic adjustments, can be tailored 
closely to institutional specifics and linked to sector priorities. However, contracts would 
require capacity building in the Ministry of Education – beyond the current capacity in the 
Higher Education Division – for analyzing data and effectively negotiating evaluation criteria 
and targets. 
Results-based funding may strike hard in institutions far from the frontier of knowledge. 
Maintaining a competitive fund for tertiary education with rigorous review processes would 
allow underperforming institutions to improve themselves by obtaining time-limited funding 
for institutional restructuring.  
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To build consensus for reform, performance funding could initially have an element of 
additional funding for tertiary education. However, a lasting impact in the sector requires 
that results-based funding be applied to a significant proportion of the base budget. Hence, 
the success of performance funding in Chilean tertiary education is closely tied to a reform 
of direct public support (AFD). 
Adopting a model of performance funding – rather than performance informed budgeting – 
would mark an important change in the funding for tertiary education in Chile. Tying 
funding directly and tightly to performance provides transparency and predictability. 
Reaching agreement beforehand on a fixed macro-budget would ensure stability in the 
budget for tertiary education. 
Changes in the funding of the traditional universities would likely meet resistance from both 
political interests and students. Therefore, a pragmatic approach, building the case for 
legislative action slowly and on the basis of results rather than more radical immediate 
reforms, may be the only way to ensure a real impact in the university system. 
Piloting agreed designs in a few tertiary institutions with reliable statistics would allow the 
system to be refined and improved before being applied to the entire sector. Particularly, it 
could be tested how best to encourage institutions to establish internal structures of 
accountability. That way agreed performance criteria and targets would be visible and have 
an impact below the level of top university management.  
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